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INFORMATION REPORT

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- 1. All officers - Party members, candidates or Komsomol members, posted to or from the HQ 12 Guards Tank Div report to the Political Branch in order to be registered in the Party records or to obtain their Party Transfer Authorizations. This registration concerns all officers including MGB officers serving with the Army Counter Espionage detachments.

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- (a) An MGB Officers' College is in Novosibirsk and is located in the Ippodromskiy Region of the town. The Transfer Authorizations were issued by the Party Organization of the Ippodromskiy Region of Novosibirsk.

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(b) As both officers were Lieutenants [] the course in the Novosibirsk College lasted at least two years, because cadets who completed an Officers' School Course of less than two years duration receive the rank of Jr Lieutenant. 25X1

(c) Training in the Novosibirsk College was apparently on a high level because the senior OKR officers of the 12 Tank Div were highly impressed with the ability and scope of knowledge of these two young officers.

3. [] the Army has very little to say in personnel matters concerning MGB officers posted to the Army. In my opinion, all postings and transfers of MGB staff are carried out by the MGB Records and Personnel Department and officers are transferred from the MGB to the Army and vice versa according to the plans and directives given by the MGB higher authorities. The MGB fears nobody except the Party. The Party rank-and-file realize very clearly how dangerous it is to cross words with the MGB while the MGB are aware that at the highest level the leading factor is the VKP (b) and that they are only a powerful tool of the Party. The result is that MGB personnel and Party members show a wholesome respect for each other, though watching each other closely, and they work together whenever necessary and possible. 25X1
4. In the Army the Counter Espionage personnel is subordinated in all Party matters to the Army Political officers. The Political Officers are not allowed to ask the MGB personnel unnecessary questions, but they are obliged to check in all details their Party records.
5. An MGB officer posted to the Army should without delay present his credentials in the Political Branch of his unit. The Party Records Instructor and the head of the Political Branch check his Party documents including his Party transfer authorization (Otkryepityelniy Talon), Party Membership Card and identity papers. An MGB officer cannot refuse to present his identity papers in the Political Branch for all Party members are instructed and know very well that the Party Membership Card (Partiyniy Bilyet) can in no circumstances replace an identity document and should be supported by the usual Military or civilian identity papers. Any person insisting that the Partbilyet is his only identity document would automatically create suspicion and according to the Party instructions should be arrested and handed over to the Security authorities.
6. The MGB personnel serving with the Army (Counter Espionage Branch) continue to be controlled by the MGB and very often, after varying periods of service with the Army Counter Espionage, return to the civilian branch of the MGB.
7. Postings of Counter Espionage officers from the Army to the MGB or from one Army unit to another are secret. Even the Party Records instructor does not know where an MGB officer is posted, he is only told to which Party organization he should send the Party documents and can perhaps guess approximately where the MGB man might be. The posting of an MGB officer returning from the Army Group [] to the MGB in the USSR is published very briefly in Unit Orders, eg "Capt X after completing his service with the Soviet Forces [] is leaving the unit for continuation of his duties in the interior districts of the USSR". (Dl. Prokhozhdanya Dalnyayshey Sluzhby Vo Vnutryennikh Okrugakh SSSR). In the Movement Order only the place of destination is shown and never a unit or organization. 25X1 25X1
8. There is a clear tendency in the Party instructions not to discuss or explain the political and strategical position of the Soviet troops in Europe on any but the higher levels of the Armed Forces personnel.
9. [] the Party realizes the positive and negative sides of the situation of the Soviet troops in Central and South-Eastern Europe as they exist at present and as they would be in the event of war and considers it undesirable to discuss or comment on these problems on the lower levels. 25X1
10. The higher army commanders from Division upwards are informed on strategical and political problems in the special lectures and conferences organized in the Army Group HQ at Potsdam. There it is emphasized the necessity of strong armed forces [] and Poland which are the guaranty for the carrying into effect of the Soviet policy in Central and Eastern Europe. It would be impossible to realize the policy of the Moscow Government in Europe without a strong Army Group [] supported by an Army Group in Poland. The latter secured also the Soviet lines of communication between the USSR and []. 25X1 25X1
11. For the masses of officers and men inside the USSR and abroad, the explanation of the presence of Soviet forces in Europe is short and very simple: "Soviet Armed forces are in Europe not as the conquerers of the new territories, their task is to secure our victory and the freedom of the other nations". (Nye Zavoyevanye Novikh Tyerritorii A Dla Obyespyechyeniya Nashey Pobyedi I Svobodni Drugikh Narodov).

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12. The policy of the VKP (b) and the Moscow Government Towards so-called "liberated countries" of Europe is in a great measure the continuation of the policy towards the non-Russian national groups inside the USSR.
13. In the Soviet Union the official Party policy is to develop and cultivate a feeling of unity and friendship among all nations of the Soviet Union, but the first place and the leading role must be reserved for the Russian nation. The Russian nation is the "elder brother" in the family of Soviet nations.
14. The last war showed clearly that the Russian State (Russkoye Gosudarstvo) was strong enough not only to endure the German invasion but also to win the war and extend the frontiers of USSR and her influence on such a large scale as never happened before in Russian history.
15. The Russian nation is the main factor of consolidation of the other nations of the Soviet Union.
16. As long as the various nations of the Soviet Union were hammered together into one nation ("Skolachivanye SSSR V Odin Narod") the Kremlin proclaimed the equality of all nations and could not give the Russians pride of place. On the contrary they let the Russians be convinced that they were treated worse and suffered more than any other nation in the Soviet Union.
17. World War II, 1941-1945, was the last act of the hammering together of Soviet nations and the Russians were officially proclaimed the leading nation of the Union. There is at present a strong tendency to extend the meaning of the word "Russians" to include Ukrainians and Byelorussians. This tendency does not refer to the Western Ukrainians whom "the Polish masters (Polskiye Fany) converted to their religion".
18. The Moscow policy towards the Satellite States is very similar to the interior Soviet national politics. During the first years after the collapse of Germany when the period of "liberation" and looting ended, the Soviet Government allowed the satellite nations to cultivate their own traditions and national way of life. Then the Russians began gradually to achieve their carefully prepared plans which could be roughly described as complete liquidation of all anti-communist and anti-Russian groups, impoverishment of the population down to a level with the Russian standard, sovietisation of administration and economic life and finally russification of the masses.
19. In the fulfillment of its policy the Soviet Government met with a number of serious very natural obstacles, such as higher standards of civilization in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, national traditions and a hostile attitude towards Russians caused either by very bad experiences during the last three centuries or by the savage behaviour of the Soviet troops during the "liberation" period.
20. One of the most difficult problems was that the Soviet Government and the Party distrusted and still distrust foreign communists. The Politburo suspects every foreign Communist of being a camouflaged nationalist. The most distrusted Communists are Poles because of their past and "in spite of their Party training and communist discipline they are nationalists and consider us (Russians) as savages and potential enemies of Poland". I even suspect Marshal Rokossovskiy of Polish nationalism for he was not born and brought up in Russia.
21. The Kremlin realized very well that Russians were not popular in the satellite countries. The plan was made to popularize Russian traditions and culture in order to raise more interest for Russia and her life among the populations of the satellite countries. Instructions given by the Politburo were either misunderstood or the Politburo, considering the increase of friendly feeling to USSR too slow, lost its temper and ordered the speeding up of the process of development of Russian propaganda in the "people's democracies". As a result of this the brutal russification and glorification of Russia (Vospyevanye Russii) started all around Central and Eastern Europe.
22. This glorification of everything Russian, and the russification, is foolish and definitely wrong for Soviet interests in those countries. glorification of Russian culture among the people whose culture is higher than Russian hurts their national pride and results in an increase of anti-Russian and of nationalist feeling.

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23. There is no danger of incorporation of satellite countries into the Soviet Union. The most important for the USSR are Poland and Czechoslovakia. These two countries are not yet prepared for incorporation. In spite of the fact that Czechs are morally weaker than Poles there would be **lots** of trouble in both countries even if the Soviet Government were able to prepare "a spontaneous decision" of their parliaments. But the main reasons for postponement of incorporation of Poland and Czechoslovakia are that the fact of incorporation of any European or Asiatic country into the Soviet Union would disclose Soviet methods of extension of the frontiers of the USSR and would frighten other nations including their own Communists and fellow-travellers. This is against the policy of the Party and the Government.
24. In case of ~~war~~ and Soviet victory over the Western coalition the political situation would change completely and then Poland and Czechoslovakia would be the first countries ready to be incorporated into the Soviet Union.

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